UK Supreme Court Imposes Secularism in Christian Schools

Parental authority must be protected. The State may not indoctrinate. Those principles are settled. What JR87 ultimately raises is a narrower, more difficult question. If compulsion is absent and withdrawal is available, how far does the Convention require structural neutrality? At what point does scrutiny of indoctrination become scrutiny of identity?

A recent decision from the top United-Kingdom court strongly defended parental rights over religious education, but to make sure that Christianity would not be promoted in Northern Ireland schools. Rather than identifying potential coercion, the Court scrutinized the entire legislative scheme for religious education and measured it against a strict “neutrality” or secular standard. The Christian character of the system was treated as suspect per se.

The Facts Behind JR87 v Department of Education

The case[1] arose from a controlled primary school in Northern Ireland operating under a statutory framework that requires religious education and daily collective worship in grant-aided schools. The School followed the prescribed core syllabus adopted under that framework. Religious education and collective worship were delivered accordingly. Collective worship took place mainly through assemblies. These included Bible-based teaching, and Christian ministers and representatives of Christian organisations were invited to address pupils. Their contributions reflected Christian doctrine and were closely linked to the syllabus. Teachers could also, at their discretion, say a short prayer with pupils, for example before snack time. These practices were neither mandatory nor prohibited; they formed part of the ordinary life of a school shaped by a Christian tradition.

The parents in JR87 did not object to religion as such, nor did they seek a wholly secular curriculum. Their concern arose when their daughter, who began school at the age of four, started to pray before meals. They believed Christianity was presented not simply as one belief among others, but as the good framework used to answer moral questions. In their view, she was not being taught about Christianity; she was being taught into it. They argued that at that age she was not yet capable of critical assessment. Because of repetition and institutional authority, what she was taught would be absorbed as truth. On that basis, they brought a claim under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights, read together with Article 9.

The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom held that religious education and collective worship, as delivered under the core syllabus, were not conveyed in an “objective, critical and pluralistic” manner and therefore breached the rights of the child and her parents. It went further and held that the statutory right of withdrawal did not cure the problem, because requiring parents to opt out could expose the child to “stigma” or place an “undue burden” on the family. This reasoning is based on the European Court of Human Rights case law.

Parental Authority or Secular Neutrality?

The Court was right to state that parents do not surrender their primary responsibility when they choose public education. It was also legitimate to examine whether the curriculum crossed the line into indoctrination. The difficulty, however, arises in the way the “objective, critical and pluralistic” standard was applied. The analysis should have focused on compulsion. Instead, it turned to structure. Rather than asking whether children were forced to believe, the Court asked whether a school shaped by a Christian tradition was sufficiently plural in its design.

Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 sets a limit against indoctrination. It does not require the State to remove every confessional feature from public education where a right of withdrawal exists. A syllabus may reflect a religious heritage without compelling adherence. Exposure is not the same as coercion. That distinction becomes decisive once the right of withdrawal is taken into account. Here, the School operated within a statutory scheme that gave parents a clear and unconditional right to withdraw their child from religious education and collective worship. No reasons were required and no penalty followed. The safeguard was legally available in this very school and existed to protect parental conscience within a system that retains a Christian character.

By holding that even this safeguard was insufficient because a child might experience discomfort or isolation, the Court adopted a demanding and distinctly secular understanding of pluralism. In effect, the Christian framework itself became suspect, even without compulsion. That step goes beyond preventing indoctrination and significantly narrows the lawful space for faith-based education within the public system.

A Measured Approach: Mahmoud v. Taylor

This decision contrasts with the United-States Supreme Court decision Mahmoud v Taylor, No 24-297 (U.S. 2025) [2], that was made in 2025. There, a school board introduced “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks into the elementary curriculum. Opt-outs were initially permitted but later withdrawn, and attendance became mandatory. Parents challenged that change.

The U.S. Supreme Court did not treat mere exposure to contested ideas as a constitutional violation. It asked whether the removal of the opt-out, combined with mandatory participation, imposed a real and objective burden on parents’ ability to direct their children’s religious upbringing. The Court’s analysis remained anchored in coercion. It did not review the curriculum for structural neutrality or ask whether it was sufficiently plural in design. The constitutional concern arose only when parents could no longer decline participation without consequence.

The contrast is therefore precise. In Mahmoud, the constitutional concern arose when withdrawal was removed and participation became compulsory. In JR87, withdrawal remained in place; the objection centered instead on the character of the confessional framework.

From Protection to Redesign

Parental authority must be protected. The State may not indoctrinate. Those principles are settled. What JR87 ultimately raises is a narrower, more difficult question. If compulsion is absent and withdrawal is available, how far does the Convention require structural neutrality? At what point does scrutiny of indoctrination become scrutiny of identity?

The judgment in JR87 suggests that a confessional framework, even without coercion, may be insufficient. We are left to ask whether the real concern was indoctrination, or whether the continued presence of a Christian framework within public education had itself become unacceptable.

By Yeram Jeon, Legal Intern.

___

References:

[1] In the matter of an application by JR87 and another for Judicial Review, [2025] UKSC 40.

[2] Mahmoud v. Taylor, No. 24-297 (U.S. 2025).